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Physicians who make mistakes are not necessarily negligent, contrary to prevailing opinion
in the medical community. The article discusses the legal concepts of "standard of care" and
"proximate cause." The incidence of favorable jury verdicts in those cases in which malpractice
suits are litigated is quite high. The effects of insurance company policies in decisions about
settlements on the incidence ofclaims is discussed and alternatives are suggested. The prevailing
belief that a consent form with a patient's signature on it is sufficient to prevent a malpractice
suit is also discussed.
Most physicians, including those who practice in academic environments, are now
extremely concerned about the threat of malpractice litigation. A good deal of this
anxiety is probably unnecessary. There is a current tendency to believe that any error
ofjudgment will result in ajudgment for the patient in a law suit and that anywritten
form with the patient's signature on it, consenting to anything, will ward offthese evil
spirits. Both ofthese conclusions are unfounded. After the physician-patient relation-
ship has been established, the physician is obligated to diagnose and treat the
patient's illness with "due care." Failure to use due care constitutes negligence, for
which the patient may recover monetary damages, but as courts have indicated, since
at least the case of Slater v. Baker and Stapleton [1] in 1767, an error ofjudgment or
a bad result is, by no means, assumed to be negligence. The standard used by courts
in determining whether or not there has been a breach of duty in any negligence
action is the "reasonable man" rule. In any professional liability suit-against a
physician, a lawyer, or an architect-"the reasonable man" becomes "the duly
careful member ofthe profession" [2]. Thus, if the physician uses due skill, care, and
knowledge in attempting to treat the patient, even though the outcome is unsatisfac-
tory there will be no negligence, as a matter of law.
To put the legal rule as simply as possible, the physician must know what a
reasonable physician with his credentials should know about the nature of the
problem and how to solve it and must proceed to solve it with adequate care. Once
that is done, there is no negligence. For example, in a situation where there is an
allegation of misdiagnosis, if all the appropriate tests were done and the reasonably
careful physician, considering the results of those tests, could have arrived at the
same erroneous conclusion, the fact that it may later be found to be wrong is not legal
negligence. In almost all medical malpractice cases, the standard of care and the
deviation from it charged as the basis ofthe action must be proved by medical expert
testimony. Thus, the physician/defendant in a malpractice suit will win, unless the
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patient presents an expert witness to testifythat the reasonable physician in that
situation would not have done what the defendant did.
Moreover, however negligent a physician's conduct may have been, if it is not the
proximate cause of damage to the patient, the patient cannot recover damages. For
example, if a misdiagnosis results in the same treatment that would have been given if
the diagnosis had been correct, even though it was negligent to fail to realize what
was wrong with the patient, the patient can show no legally recognizable harm as the
result of the error. One example ofthis, on which there have been many cases [3], is a
failure to recognize that an elderly person has fractured a hip in a fall. Since the
patient would have been sent to bed even under a finding that there was no fracture,
and since an elderly person with a fractured hip is sent to bed, discovery two weeks
later that a fracture was missed is usually not held to constitute grounds for recovery
of damages. Prolongation of the treatment process, if significant, may however, in
and of itself, be an element of the damage that the patient alleges.
The standard of care required is that of the reasonably careful physician with the
same training. Thus, it is quite clear that specialists are held to a standard much
higher than generalists in treating conditions within their speciality. In fact, special-
ists are now held to national standards of care. A Board-Certified internist in a town
of 5,000 is thus held to the same standard of care as a tenured professor of medicine
in a teaching hospital. The locality rule, which stated that the degree ofcare required
is measured by "that obtaining in the same or similar communities" is no longer
applied to specialists. The courts had invented that rule to protect doctors in isolated
geographical situations at a time when transportation and communication were well-
nigh impossible. As it has become easier for physicians to keep up with advances in
medical care, the reason for the locality rule no longer exists. It has been universally
rejected in almost all cases involving specialists in courts all over the country. It is no
longer applied even to generalists in some states, although other states still accept it
[4].
The 1973 Presidential Commission on Malpractice surveyed all the cases closed by
all the commercial malpractice carriers in 1970, thus reflecting suits filed for several
years, and discovered that in cases that go to jury trial, physicians win almost 80
percent of the actions [5]. The percentage of successful suits today is probably higher
because it is the policy of commercial insurance companies to settle cases as cheaply
as possible without regard to the existence or absence of provable negligence [6].
Thus, a very small number of suits are ever tried and those that are tried are the ones
that can be won without undue expenses.
Commercial insurance companies are, after all, profit-making organizations. Ifthe
adjustors can settle a nuisance claim for $2,500, even though they recognize that there
was no negligence involved in the care of the patient, rather than pay $5,000 to
$10,000 in legal fees to take the matter to trial and win it, they are certainly going to
opt for the quick settlement as a matter of financial self-interest. Needless to say, the
settlements accumulated during the year are also a decisive factor in the computation
of premiums for the next year [7].
Since this method of dealing with cases is known to claimants' lawyers in each
community, there is often no hesitation about filing a suit, sometimes even without
having the chart read by an outside expert to confirm the existence of negligence.
"Lawyer letters,"-a notification to a physician that a claim exists, and "if you do not
pay money, we will file a suit,"-are frequently written only on the basis of what the
client has told the lawyer and before the chart has even been requested by the lawyer
from the Record Room of the hospital. Since the dated authorization from the
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patient to the hospital requesting that a copy of the record be sent to the lawyer is
placed in the patient's chart, as is a dated notation by the Record Room clerk as to
the date the record was sent to the lawyer, it is quite easy to determine whether the
lawyer letter preceded the receipt of the record. My experience would indicate that it
happens with roughly one-third of the lawyer letters received at Yale-New Haven
Hospital.
On the other hand, in those instances where physicians havejoined doctor-owned,
medical society-sponsored insurance programs of one sort or another, one of the
motivations for changing to the program has been an unwillingness to pay off
nuisance claims [8]. It is reported as anecdotal by many lawyers involved in these self-
insurance programs that as soon as it becomes common knowledge that the
institution or group is insuring itself, the number of lawyer letters and suits received
diminishes rapidly. The implicit message to plaintiffs' lawyers in the community from
an institution or group of physicians who have gone self-insured is that if they want
to get any money, in all but a few cases of obvious negligence, they should be
prepared to go to trial. Bearing in mind that a lawyer who takes a case on a
contingency fee and who loses gets nothing, the number of claims filed can be
expected to diminish. No empirical studies, as far as I am aware, have ever compared
the number of claims filed against institutions while commercially insured, and then
several years later after they have gone into a self-insurance scheme, but it would be
extremely surprising if the number of nuisance claims has not dropped quite
remarkably.
It may be more expensive at the beginning of a self-insurance program to spend the
money required to retain excellent defense counsel to prepare these cases thoroughly
and go to court and win them. It may, in the end, resolve as a policy decision as to
whether an institution would rather pay $25,000 once or $2,500 ten times in a given
year. The former policy, I believe, is more likely to solve the malpractice problem on
a long-term basis. Moreover, a policy in which an institution defends its doctors,
regardless of cost, where the peers of the physician are convinced that there was no
negligence and the claim is non-meritorious, may have psychological advantages to
the group. Physicians may be less distressed by the spectre of the Ghost of
Malpractice Past hanging over them as they work each day if they no longer feel
abandoned by the institution. Institutional policies that approach the malpractice
issue must, in fact, take into consideration such factors as the way the physicians view
claims defense, since most cases of any severity brought against an academic
institution or a teaching hospital allege doctor-error, not errors ofjudgment by other
professionals.
Since physicians who have "gone bare" and dropped all insurance have no
reporting mechanism by which the numbers of suits can be determined, it is
impossible to know what effect this trend has had on the number of cases filed against
them. However, any physician can make a negligent mistake that kills or cripples a
patient and failure to insure raises serious ethical issues when the patient has no
recourse for the compensation of a valid claim. Moreover, schemes to "go bare" and
put all assets in a spouse's or child's name may, if a judgment is awarded to a patient
and not paid, result in a suit for fraudulent concealment of assets, in addition to the
original one for malpractice.
Another common misconception of physicians about malpractice problems is that
if they get a patient to sign a form saying, "I consent," their worries will be over. The
doctrine of informed consent is a highly complex one, involving negotiations with the
patient about a proposal for treatment. Legal rules require that a patient be informed
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of the nature and purpose of the treatment, its risks, the possible benefits, the
alternatives (including the alternative of non-treatment), and the risks of each
alternative. This is a very neat way to explain what is required; it is ofvery little help
to a physician who is trying to do his or her best in discussions with the patient. For
example, a lawyer cannot tell a physician how to define "risk," for purposes of
disclosure to a patient. It is that which most physicians would agree is a risk. For
example, does one case report constitute notice of risk so that forever after, all
physicians obtaining consent for that procedure must mention it to the patient?
Divested of the mysteries imposed by decisions written by appellate judges, many
of whom apparently do not consider that doctors are required to apply the language
of those opinions in their daily dealings with patients, the doctrine of informed
consent is really very simple. As one court eloquently put it: "The informed consent
doctrine is based on the proposition that every competent patient is the final arbitor
of whether or not he gets cut, by whom he gets cut and where he gets cut. A patient
has the sovereign choice of whether he will submit to surgery in the course of the
diagnosis and treatment and in order to make this choice meaningful and realistic,
the doctor is under a legal duty to disclose to a patient any serious risks involved in
the contemplated surgery and the alternatives available to him, including the risks
from non-treatment" [9]. Thus, the patient must have enough information to make
an intelligent choice. This means, in most cases, that the considerations should be
what the patient needs to know and not what the physician normally tells people.
Informed consent and a consent form are two different things. Inadequate
discussion with the patient, followed by thrusting a piece of paper under his or her
nose and asking for a signature is regarded by some physicians as "the way to solve
the problem." Although it is fairly clear law that a patient is held to understand the
explicit terms of any document which is signed, in almost all cases what the consent
form actually says is, "The risks of the procedure have been explained to me and I
understand them." If the form is a general one, the patient will argue in a subsequent
suit that a specific piece of information was not given. The physician will argue,
equally emphatically, that he always gives patients that information and therefore he
must have told this patient. The best defense to a suit involving informed consent
issues is, in fact, a thorough discussion with the patient followed by a note in the
patient's chart of the specifics of what the patient was told, such as the probability of
paralysis, pain, death, blindness, or whatever is appropriate. Thus, when the patient
has such an untoward outcome and claims never to have heard about that risk before,
the chart will serve as documentary evidence that the information was, in fact,
disclosed.
Patients whose physicians care enough about them and about their concerns as
well as their diseases, to discuss the matter thoroughly almost never sue for
malpractice, even when the result is catastrophic [10]. In most cases, those who are
sued are physicians who have given their patients the impression their disease may be
interesting, but their personalities and feelings are not worthy ofreasonable consider-
ation. Patients whose hospital course is stormy, but who also ring the bell for a nurse
for half an hour without response, get the wrong thing for dinner, have a problem
with the Billing Office, get a letter from a collection agency when they have the
cancelled checks proving they have already paid the bills, and, on top ofit all, cannot
reach the physician when they call, are the patients whose impulse is to seek the first
available lawyer.
The informed consent doctrine is often viewed as a mysterious imposition by
lawyers and judges on physicians. The principle that it attempts to articulate,
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however, i.e., that a competent adult has the right to make choices about what will
become of his or her body, cannot reasonably be denied. The amount of interaction
in advance of treatment that goes on between the physician and the patient, in a
respectful, caring way, does more to prevent malpractice suits than anythingelse that
can be done. Consent forms are not the answer; informed consent is undoubtedly not
only required by law, but by good medical practice, as well.
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